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Why Did the Signers of the Declaration of Independence 
Engage in this Treasonous Act? 
 
Marvin L. Simner 
 
Abstract 
The penalty for committing an act of treason against the Crown in 1775, as read by British 
judges sentencing Irish rebels, was as follows: 
You are to be drawn on hurdles to the place of execution, where you are to be hanged 
by the neck, but not until you are dead; for, while you are still living your bodies are to 
be taken down, your bowels torn out and burned before your faces, your heads then cut 
off, and your bodies divided each into four quarters, and your heads and quarters to be 
then at the King’s disposal; and may the Almighty God have mercy on your souls.1  
Those who signed the Declaration of Independence were well aware of the fact that, by virtue 
of their signatures, they would be endorsing a treasonous act and, if caught, their punishment 
would be as described above.  Because of the horrendous nature of this punishment, it is not 
surprising that over the years the 56 delegates who signed this document were often said to be 
among the most heroic of the early patriots.  The evidence to be reported, however, shows that 
the events that took place prior to the issuing of the Declaration may have encouraged the 
signers to voluntarily engage in this act without any fear of punishment.  Some further evidence 
reported below also provides a possible answer to a question raised by Meier (1997) who asked 
why the delegates even bothered to sign the Declaration. 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
Marvin L. Simner, copyright @2021, all rights reserved.   A preliminary version of this material 
was present at a meeting of the Society for Learning in Retirement, London, Ontario.  Address 





Why Did the Signers of the Declaration of Independence  
Engage in this Treasonous Act? 
Marvin L. Simner 
Speaking on Independence Day, 1821, John Quincy Adams, 6th President of the Unites States 
and the son of John Adams, a signer of the Declaration, stated that the Declaration of 
Independence 
 was merely an occasional state-paper.  It was a solemn exposition to the world, of the 
causes which have compelled the people of a small portion of the British empire, to cast 
off their allegiance and renounce the protection of the British king: and to dissolve their 
social connection with the British people.2  
Although at the time it may have been “merely an occasional state-paper,” in recent years the 
Declaration has been referred to as a “war document”3 and, because of its message, Maier 
summarized its impact in the following words:  “From the viewpoint of those who opposed its 
message, the Declaration was nothing less than a public confession of treason.”4   In view of the 
seriousness of this public confession Brodie even provided her readers with a detailed 
description of the horrendous penalty for treason (see the Abstract) which did not change until 
March 17, 1813, when  Parliament approved  a bill to include only hanging or beheading as a 
more humane form of punishment.   Given the brutal nature of this early punishment, coupled 
with their “pledge to each other (of) our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor,” as stated in 
the Declaration itself, it is certainly not surprising that the 56 delegates to the Second 
Continental Congress in Philadelphia who signed the Declaration have often been considered 
among the most heroic figures in American history.5  The author of an 1857 publication titled 
“American’s Own Book” characterized their lives and  the personal consequences of performing 
this deed  in the following manner. 
The memories of few men will perhaps be cherished, by their posterity, with more 
jealous and grateful admiration than those of the patriotic individuals, who first signed 
the political independence of our country.  They hazarded by the deed not only their 
lands and possessions but their personal freedom and their lives, and when it is 
considered that most of them were in the vigor of existence, gifted with considerable 
fortune, and with all the offices and emoluments at the disposal of royalty within their  
reach, the sacrifice which they risked appears magnified, and their disinterested 




The purpose of the current undertaking was to ask if  the act of signing the Declaration was 
truly fraught with as much danger as has so often been suggested.   To answer this question we 
reviewed the timeframe and events associated with the drafting and the dissemination of each 
of the three initial versions of the Declaration.  
The Emergence of the Declaration of Independence 
The first phase in the development of the Declaration occurred on June 7, 1776, during a 
meeting of the Second Continental Congress when Richard Henry Lee from Virginia presented 
the following motion on behalf of Virginia to the congressional delegates in Philadelphia. 
That these united colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent states, 
that they are absolved from all allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political 
connection between them and the state of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally 
dissolved.7  
Owing to the  contentious nature of Lee’s motion  it was decided that a vote on the motion 
needed to be delayed until July 1 so that the delegates would have sufficient time to meet with 
the colonies they represented to determine how best to deal with this matter. Because of  
comments that had occurred during the course of the initial debate it was also decided that a 
committee needed to be formed to draft a document that reflected the justification as well as 
the  significance of the motion. 
On June 10 the Continental Congress appointed the following five delegates to form such a 
committee:  John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, Richard Henry Lee, Robert Livingston and Robert 
Sherman.  As the result of his role in preparing the Virginia motion Lee was also asked to draft 
the follow-up document requested by Congress.    On June 11 Lee received word that his wife 
was ill and that he needed to return to Virginia immediately.  It was due to his abrupt departure 
that Thomas Jefferson, a fellow delegate from Virginia, was asked to take his place and to 
prepare the required draft.8   
The second  phase took place on June 28, 1776, when Congress met as a whole  to read 
Jefferson’s draft, which had been modified to some extent by several committee members.   
Because it was felt that the submitted draft required still further modifications, it was decided 
to postpone ratification for several days.  The third phase  occurred on  July 2 when the final 
revised draft was read and approved, but not signed.  Next, Charles Thomson, Secretary of the 
Continental Congress,  
Ordered that the Declaration be authenticated & printed.  That the committee 
appointed to prepare the Declaration superintend & correct the press.  That copies of 




of safety and to the several commanding officers of the continental troops and that it be 
proclaimed in each of the united states & at the head of the army.  
This unsigned body of the Declaration was then delivered to Thomas Dunlap, a local printer in 
preparation for printing.  It has been estimated that around 200 paper copies of this initial 
version of the Declaration were printed and circulated as required by Congress.  Of this 
number, 21 copies  are known to exist and 17 were examined in the 1970s  by Fredrick Goff.9   
Although it has been claimed by Wilfred Ritz10 that 34 of the delegates who were present on 
July 2 signed the document, the only names  Goff  identified were those of the Congressional 
Secretary, Charles Thomson, and the President of the Continental Congress, John Hancock.  
Thus, if the claim by Ritz has any merit, what might have been signed was the printer’s proof 
which, it is said, has never been found and may have been destroyed (see page 189 in Ritz).  
While it is unknown if these 34 delegates purposely avoided signing the circulated  document to 
prevent being charged with treason, because of the absence of their names, it is extremely 
unlikely that any would have been charged with treason.   
The first formal public reading of the document took place on July 8 in Philadelphia and the first 
newspaper to publish the body of the Declaration was the Pennsylvania Evening Post on July 6 
followed by a German translation published in Philadelphia on July 9.  On that same day George 
Washington received his copy and, in compliance with the order from Congress, had it read to 
his troops.  According to Maier,11 Washington and Congress hoped that the  material contained 
in the body of the Declaration would inspire the soldiers, and “might also encourage  men to 
join the army and help American affairs take a more favorable  turn.”  
 In line with this last point, it is worth noting that of the many grievances in the Declaration that 
were levied against the British, with few exceptions, most  began with the words “He has 
refused…, He has forbidden…”  By personalizing the enemy in this fashion the colonists’ anger 
was clearly  directed solely at the crown which would have made military recruitment far easier 
than if the blame for the grievances had been placed on the largely amorphous body of the 
British Parliament.   In the words of Black,12 this terminology was an intentional “indictment of 
a conspirator, who had misused his executive power…making George akin to an Old Testament 
plague.”  Indeed, it was the case that after hearing the Declaration, hatred of the king had 
become so pronounced that crowds in many cities tore down and destroyed signs or statues 
representing authority.  For example, in New York City  an equestrian statue of King George was 
pulled down and the lead used to make musket balls.13   Because it was also the case that a 
number of the grievances had already been resolved or never enforced,14 these may have been 
included in the Declaration, at least in part, to refresh the colonists’ memories of their previous 




When understood in this way, the initial printing of the Declaration, which was circulated but 
unsigned, might not have been intended as a war document, in the literal sense of a declaration 
of war, but instead  to serve as a military recruitment tool or call to arms in the event that a full 
scale war with Britain ever became necessary.   Given this possibility it is not surprising that 
Maier15 was further led to conclude that the Dunlap Broadside “was designed first and 
foremost for domestic consumption.”     
The second version of the Declaration, which was finished on August 2, 1776, had a very 
different purpose.  Known as the Matlack copy, this time the Declaration was printed on 
parchment and it was hoped that everyone would sign by August 2.16   With the exception of 
five delegates who signed sometime later, everyone  did so by this date.   Because only one 
copy was produced, this parchment version was not destined for widespread distribution but, 
instead, was intended for later preservation in a  permanent location once the war was over.  
Hence, very few people outside of the members of the Continental Congress would have been 
aware of this signed copy  since it “traveled with the Continental Congress as it moved by land 
and by water during the Revolutionary War…(possibly) rolled for transport or, just as likely, 
folded to fit into a saddle bag or wooden chest.”17  
The level of secrecy associated with the Matlack copy as well as the degree of anonymity that 
had accompanied the Dunlap Broadside, changed with the printing of the third and final version 
of the Declaration.   Known as the Goddard Broadside this version was authorized by Congress 
on January 18, 1777.  It was printed on paper with the names of all but one of the 56 signers 
(Thomas McKean), and was intended for public distribution to a much wider audience than the 
Dunlap Broadside.  With the release of this third version, the public for the first time became 
aware of those who had endorsed the message contained in the document.   Until then, outside 
of the delegates themselves, no one  knew who had actually been responsible for the message.  
In fact, it wasn’t until 1784 that Thomas Jefferson was even identified as its author! 
What is most important here in relation to the issue at hand is the date when this third version 
was released to the public.  By late December, 1776, early January, 1777, the Continental Army 
under George Washington’s command, had gained what were extremely important military 
victories in New Jersey.  The battle of Trenton was won on December 26, 1776, while the 
victory at Princeton was achieved on January 3, 1777.   In commenting on the timing of this 
release Maier18 made the following observation. 
They (the signers) were not given to throwing their fate into God’s hands needlessly.  
Only on January 18, 1777, after the long, disastrous military campaign of 1776 (in which 
the Americans suffered  major losses in the battles of Brooklyn Heights and New York 




Congress send the states authentic copies of the Declaration of independence with the 
names of the members…subscribing the same.  
Although it is unclear what Maier might have meant by the statement “throwing their fate into 
God’s hand’s needlessly,” it is possible that the delegates could have  considered this an 
opportune moment for reaching a negotiated settlement for ending the war with Great Britain. 
Given the losses the British had already suffered at Lexington and Concord, Bunker Hill, Boston 
and now at Trenton and Princeton, it could be that this third version with all of the names 
attached, was released at a time when the members of the Continental Congress might have 
been reasonably confident that more  British losses were to be expected  in the future.  If the 
Continental Army had been successful in achieving this goal, the Declaration with its list of 
grievances could then have been used as the starting point for such negotiations.  As one of the 
conditions for achieving a peaceful settlement, Congress, no doubt, would have requested the 
dismissal of any charges of treason that otherwise  could have been levied against the signers of 
this document.   
There are several reasons for suggesting  that this might have been the case.   First, because of 
the successes that had already been realized in resolving a number of the grievances (see end 
note 14) it would  have seemed reasonable to think  that similar progress could have been 
achieved in resolving the remaining grievances through an early set of talks with 
representatives from Great  Britain.  Second, as recently as July 8, 1775, the Continental 
Congress had attempted to broker an end to the impending war when it sent to the King an 
appeal for reconciliation known as the Olive Branch Petition.19    Although this petition was 
initially rejected, Lord Dartmouth received the King’s approval in February, 1776, to send a 
commission to the colonies to negotiate reconciliation on the basis of the Olive Branch 
Petition20 and word of this commission had reached  the members of  Congress as early as May, 
1776.21  Third, Benjamin Franklin had been in discussion with two of the highest ranking British 
commanders in North America, General William Howe and his brother, a Vice-Admiral in the 
British navy, both of whom were strongly in favor of finding a peaceful solution to the 
impending conflict.   In the spring of 1776 General Howe  sent a letter to London that expressed 
his reservations about a British victory owing to the strength of the colonial military and had 
even previously proposed several means for achieving a negotiated settlement.22    Finally, the 
delegates were also aware of Franklin’s conversations with Lord Chatham, an important 
member in the House of Lords who had supported a peaceful settlement with the colonists.  On 
February 1, 1775, Lord Chatham introduced “A provisional Act for Settling the Troubles in 
America,” that was designed to “pacify America” by granting the Continental Congress “a role in 




In addition to this parliamentary and military support in favor of a peaceful solution to these 
difficulties, it was also known that a similar level of support existed among the citizens of Great 
Britain who were kept fully informed throughout this period of all the events that were taking 
place in the colonies. 
It is a fact of some importance that English newspapers made the colonial interpretation 
of events in America accessible to the English public in precisely those terms that (the 
Continental) Congress thought most convincing.  In its first petition to the Crown, 
Congress explicitly planned a public relations campaign in England in the hope of 
eliciting public support for its actions…The English press cooperated in this effort with 
surprising unanimity; even those editors who were hostile to the colonies consistently 
printed the most important papers…During the Stamp Act crisis all the key trading and 
industrial areas of England petitioned for repeal; a decade later, sixteen of these 
twenty-five places (64%) appealed once again for conciliation…In 1775 the people of 
England advised the king of England: If this plan (of war) should continue to be enforced, 
it must be attended with a great waste of blood and treasure to this country, without 
any well-grounded prospect of success, and may finally deprive these kingdoms of the 
valuable trade of America, and force the inhabitants of that country, against their 
inclination and interest, to set up an independent state.24  
Unfortunately for the Congressional delegates, however, shortly after the release of the third 
version of the Declaration the tide of war had changed for the worse which meant that the 
possibility of now reaching a negotiated settlement as the result of the Continental Army’s early 
position of strength, had quickly become remote.   Beginning with the Battle of Bound Brook on 
April 13, 1777, of the 39 engagements that were fought between the colonial victories at 
Trenton and Princeton and when the French military first entered the war (September, 1778), 
only 10 battles were won by the Americans  while the British had won 29 which meant that the 
British were no longer in a position of weakness.  
It goes without saying that If the end of the war had favored the British, the signers of the 
Goddard version of the Declaration, whose names were now well known, could very well have 
been charged with treason.  Despite this possibility though, all was not necessarily lost, at least 
in the minds of the delegates who had agreed on January 18, 1777, to sign this version of the 
Declaration.   On June 20, 1776, which was well before the release date for this third version,  
British Vice-Admiral Richard Howe had issued a statement that offered amnesty to any 
American who agreed that he would not participate in any further rebellious activities against 
the Crown.  His brother, General Howe, on November 30, 1776, extended the same offer to 
those who would agree to “remain in peaceful obedience to his Majesty…(and) In the fall of 




Within a few weeks, British authorities reported that more than three thousand people had 
come forward to make an oath of allegiance to George III and take their ‘protection papers’.25 
Of central importance to the current report, Richard Stockton, one of the Declaration’s early 
signers and “high on the list of the Americans the British sought to capture,” was arrested and 
imprisoned on November 3, 1776.   On December 29, 1776, Stockton also took advantage of 
this offer, initialed the required statement, and was set free.  “Had he not signed the Amnesty 
statement he would have remained in prison with the liability of being ‘hanged , drawn and 
quartered,’ as  well as losing all of his property, thus impoverishing his family.”26   The critical 
point here is that those whose printed names appeared on this third widely circulated version 
of the Declaration would have known about the Howe brothers’ offer and could have allowed 
their names to be released in January 1777 with full knowledge that if worse came to worse 
they too would have been able to avoid  a charge of treason by taking the same oath before the 
war ended.   
Conclusion 
 Based on the foregoing evidence It seems reasonable to draw the following conclusions.  The 
first version of the Declaration, intended principally for domestic consumption, was used as a 
recruiting tool for the colonial military rather than as a “war document,” and if those who are 
said to have signed it on July 4, only signed the printer’s proof, not the circulated copy, they 
were probably not concerned about being charged with treason.  The second version, which did 
contain their names, was only available on a single parchment copy that was carefully 
protected and hidden throughout the war.  This version, too, probably would not have 
generated any fear of bringing charges of treason because, in all likelihood, it would  have been 
destroyed if subsequent events  suggested that the war was about to be lost.  Finally, the third  
version, though widely circulated and with all but one of the delegates names, was released at 
a time when the delegates were aware that if they subsequently signed the British offer of 
amnesty, this action on their part would  have negated the charges of treason.   In essence  
those who added their names on July 4, 1776, August 2, 1776,  or even as late as January 18, 
1777,  probably did so in full knowledge of the fact that, regardless of when or what they 
signed, the odds of  being charged and convicted of treason were  extremely remote.  Hence, 
the belief that the 56 delegates who signed the Declaration had  voluntarily engaged in this act 
despite the horrendous nature of the punishment that would have ensued if caught, appears to 
be unfounded.  
Whether or not one still wishes to view the signers as heroes, however, it must be said that 
with few exceptions they were among the ablest, the brightest, the best educated, and the 




colleges of the day either in America or England and of the 56 signers, following the revolution, 
two became Presidents of the United States, two others became United States Senators, and 14  
were  state governors.   During the early stages of the revolution many took part in committees 
to draft the Articles of Confederation as well as templates on how to establish alliances with 
other counties both for trade and to seek help during the war.  We mention these points 
because they have an important bearing on a further question regarding the signers posed by 
Pauline Maier. 
Why, however, was it (the Declaration) signed at all?  Only John Browne, Parliament’s 
clerk, signed the English Declaration of Rights.  Moreover, according to Lois Schwoerer, 
the members of England’s seventeenth-century Parliaments did not customarily sign 
instruments they presented to the King, nor were declarations and petitions signed by 
their drafters elsewhere in Europe.  “Of the documents comparable to the Declaration 
of Rights,” she says, “only the Declaration of Independence of the American colonies 
was signed by its framers.”27  
As one possible answer to her question Maier noted that the Crown did not recognize the 
legitimacy of Congress.  By signing this document, the delegates signified that each of the 
colonies they represented were in support of the terms contained within the document.  “This 
was, they seemed to say, not the work of an inconsequential faction of colonists, as their critics 
in England so often alleged, but the voice of the American people and of the men of 
consequence they selected to speak for them.”28  
While Maier’s answer certainly could be correct, there is also another way to address this 
matter.  In line with a point raised above (see page 6), consider for the moment that the 
Declaration might not have been intended solely for use as either a war document or a 
recruiting tool but, instead, as a legally crafted instrument issued collectively by thirteen 
sovereign nations (as the term “United States” implies)  to bring about a negotiated end to an 
impending war.29  We raise this possibility because within the body of the Declaration were the 
grievances the Crown had been asked to rectify and that served as justification for the 
concluding section which contained the words by Richard Henry Lee (see page 3) as grounds for 
achieving a  solution to end the hostilities.    
Following its ratification the 56 members of Congress who signed the Declaration would now be 
empowered to serve as duly elected bargaining agents or representatives of the United States 
(“We…the Representatives of the United States of America”).  Since 25 of the 56 members were 
lawyers, given their legal training  they  would have been well aware of the need for  signatures 
because it was common practice at the time for sovereign nations  to add the  signatures of 
those charged with negotiating contractual arrangements to the bottom of all relevant 




of Watertown, the purpose of which was to create a negotiated contractual arrangement 
between the State of Massachusetts Bay and several Indian bands for the purpose of 
establishing a military alliance.   On July 19, 1776, which was very shortly after the Declaration 
was ratified, the Treaty was signed by the 17 Governors of the State of Massachusetts Bay.31    
Although Britain did not agree with the colonies self-proclaimed designation as a series of 
“sovereign nations,” Britain apparently did agree with this proposed use of the Declaration.  In 
March 1778 Parliament authorized the Carlisle Peace Commission to grant the colonies a 
number of concessions designed to end the war, many of which stemmed directly or indirectly 
from the grievances in the Declaration.32  According to Weldon Brown’s 1941 summary  of the 
Peace Commission’s mandate, 
England proposed a restoration of conditions existing prior to 1763… (and) there was to 
be a relaxation of the principle of parliamentary legislative supremacy.  The colonists 
were to have a greater share in their government, such as the popular election of 
governors, and their own customs officials…The colonies could have a representation in 
Parliament, and  Parliament would recognize the priority of Congress over American 
affairs…Standing armies  in America in peace time could be discarded if the colonies 
would supply their own  troops.  Changes in provincial governments and charters were 
not to be made except by popular consent…(and there was to be ) colonial freedom 
from parliamentary taxation… 33 
There is little doubt, based on Brown’s summary, that the concessions offered by the Peace 
Commission represented a major shift in how much Britain was willing to sacrifice in order to 
reconcile  the differences between the two countries in an effort to end the war and keep the  
American colonies within the British fold.  In fact, Brown  even concluded that “The recognition 
of Congress  was a virtual renunciation of the legislative supremacy of Parliament over the 
internal affairs of the colonies.  These instructions (to the Commission) showed that England 
was at last awaking to the fact that America was a nation, strong and powerful.  Beyond the 
possibility of British subjection.”34   In 2005 David Wilson further concluded that when the 
Commission arrived in America it was “empowered by the British king to give Congress nearly 
anything it wanted to end the rebellion.”35    
 Despite the promise that the Commission’s mandate held for reconciliation, the Commission’s 
goal was doomed from the start.   Owing largely to the victory that the continental army had 
achieved at Saratoga on October 7, 1777, coupled with an agreement that France would 
provide military assistance to aid the colonies in their war with Britain, even before the 
Commission arrived in America in June, 1778, their offerings were viewed with contempt by the 




the Commissioners, which was “to treat, consult, and agree upon Means of quieting the 
disorders in the Colonies,”36 Congress resolved on April 22, 1778, that  
…these United States cannot with propriety, hold any conference or treaty with any 
commissions on the part of Great Britain, unless they shall, as a preliminary thereto, 
either withdraw their fleets and armies, or else, in positive and express terms, 
acknowledge the independence of said states.37 
In essence, the delegates were so convinced that America would now win the war there was no 
need to accept or even consider the Commission’s offerings and so on June 17, 1778, which was 
when the final  unanimous Congressional decision was reached,38  the war was allowed to 
continue until five years later when the Paris Peace Treaty, which finally ended the war, was 
signed on September 3, 1783.    
Epilogue 
 Before we leave this last topic, and in line with remarks by Anthony Gregory, it is worth asking 
whether the Congressional decision to reject the Commission’s offerings was indeed 
“unanimous” as stated above.   In a 2018 review of the workings  of the Carlisle Peace 
Commission, Gregory drew attention to this point when he noted that none of the historians 
who had thus far evaluated the outcome of the Commission’s efforts “scrutinized the 
Congress’s confident claims of unanimity.”39  While not among the reasons given by Gregory for 
raising his concern, our concern with the word “unanimous,” when used in this especially  
critical  context, strongly suggests that the Continental Congress as a whole must have been in 
agreement when the decision was reached to reject the Commission’s offerings.  Unfortunately, 
this was not the case.   Of the  80 elected delegates who were eligible to cast a vote during the 
1778 Congressional meetings, only 31 were in attendance when the final vote was tallied on 
June 17.40    The Congressional record for that date also shows that in the case of North Carolina 
none of its five elected representatives were present and in five of the other states the 
numbers in attendance were substantially lower than the numbers elected.  In Connecticut 
whereas eight were elected only three attended, in Maryland eight were also elected but only 
two were present, while  in Georgia one attended whereas five were elected, and in New Jersey 
as well as in Pennsylvania nine were elected in both states, yet of these 18 delegates only five 
were available to cast a vote.   
The question these attendance figures raise, of course, is whether the views held by such 
relatively small numbers were truly representative of the views held by the much larger body 
charged with making decisions on behalf of the Second Continental Congress.  This matter 




31 delegates towards the Peace Commission itself as revealed in the following material that 
also appeared in the Congressional minutes and was unanimously approved on June 17. 
Whereas, many letters, addressed to individuals  of these United States, have been 
lately received from England, through the conveyance of the enemy (the Peace 
Commission), and some of them, which have been under the inspection of members of 
Congress, are found to contain ideas insidiously calculated to divide and delude the 
good people of these states: Resolved, That it be and it is hereby earnestly 
recommended to the legislative executive authorities of the several states, to exercise  
the utmost care and vigilance and take the most effectual measures to put a stop to so 
dangerous and criminal a correspondence. 
In addition to this warning, on June 17 the 31 delegates also unanimously agreed on the 
appointment of  a sub-committee that consisted of three members (Richard Henry Lee, William 
Henry Drayton, and Gouverneur Morris), all of whom were strongly in favor of independence 
and opposed to reconciliation.41  The sole purpose of this sub-committee was to review and 
censor all of the correspondence from the Commission. 
In sum, our concern with the word “unanimous,” which stems from both the numerical 
evidence and the attendance records cited above along with these two further points, is how 
open minded to reconciliation were these 31 representatives in relation to the 80 delegates as 
a whole?   While it is not possible to know the views of the main body of the 1778 delegation, 
when the delegation that  met in 1775-1776 to decide on the issue of independence versus 
reconciliation, these two opposing positions were debated at considerable length on the floor 
of Congress. The following comment by York offers a sense of the uncertainty that had existed 
among a very large number over the two conflicting political ideologies.  
Through the fall of 1775, for every John Adams wanting independence there were 
probably two other patriots wanting reconciliation.  There continued to be, as Adams 
observed, “a Strange Oscillation between Love and Hatred, between War and Peace.”  
Thus the messages from leaders in New York and New Jersey, as well as from 
Pennsylvania and Maryland, urging Congress not to do anything precipitate, anything 
that could frustrate their desire to reunify the empire.42  
As a concrete illustration of this Congressional rancor, even though the colonies had voted to 
ratify the Declaration on July 2, 1776, as recently as one day before the vote was taken, not all 
of the colonies or the delegates chosen to represent the colonies necessarily favored the 
message of independence contained within the document.  On July 1 a “Committee of the 
Whole took a vote and found that only nine of the thirteen colonies were ready to support 




York still without official authorization to vote for independence.”43  In terms of the delegates 
themselves, although 88 were authorized to attend the Second Continental Congress in 1775-
76, and 34 might have signed the printer’s proof on July 4, 22 others waited until August 2  or  
later to sign, and the remaining delegates did not sign at all. 
While the reasons for delaying or failing to sign are not known for every delegate, Carter 
Braxton, one of the delegates who had delayed until August 2, mentioned several reasons  that 
were given by many of his peers.44   One reason centered on the fear that once independence 
from Britain was achieved, civil wars could erupt among several of the colonies over long 
simmering border disputes.   For instance, the border dispute between Connecticut and 
Pennsylvania, which dated back to the charter of 1662 and erupted in gunfire in the 1770s, was 
not resolved until 1783 when “All local Pennsylvania officials in the formally contested area 
were ordered to protect Connecticut people in the Wyoming Valley, and Pennsylvania settlers 
were warned not to molest them.”45  A second reason stemmed from an equally longstanding 
desire on the part of many to actually achieve reconciliation.   As long as the colonies delayed 
their endorsement of separation, the possibility of reaching a negotiated settlement of the 
differences that existed between the colonies and Great Britain could continue to be explored.  
Once independence was declared, however, that possibility would no longer exist.  Strangely 
enough, Thomas Jefferson was among those who initially had hoped for reconciliation.  Seven 
months after the battles of Lexington and Concord he wrote “There is not in the British Empire 
a man who more cordially loves a union with Great Britain than I do.”  Following his assessment 
of the grievances, however, he was “saddened that he could no longer live in what he deemed 
an unjust empire.”46 
We mention these points because if a more representative body of delegates had been present 
on June 17, 1778, and if their views had resembled the views of those who met  in 1775-76, the 
Commission’s offerings might not have been rejected and the war could have ended  five years 
earlier and avoided “a great waste of blood and treasure.”   
Most students of the war believe that about thirty thousand who served in the 
Continental army perished while on duty, a percentage roughly equal to the total of 
regulars in the Civil War and nearly ten times greater than among those whose soldiered 
for the United States in World War II.  If these conservative estimates are correct,  about 
one in sixteen American males died in the Revolutionary War, compared with one in ten 
in the Civil War, and one in seventy-five in World War II…(In terms of Britain and her 
allies) one-quarter of all British and German soldiers deployed in North America  - 
roughly ten thousand redcoats and seventy-five hundred mercenaries died there…Taken 
as a whole, in excess of fifty thousand who served Great Britain died and more than 




hundred thousand who served in British and European armies lost their lives in this 
widespread conflagration.47 
 An early end to the war also would have greatly attenuated the financial burden that the 
colonies were subsequently forced to endure.   According to material provided by the Avalon 
Project at the Yale Law School, although France was certainly an essential ally, it did not offer its 
military assistance merely as a gracious gesture.  At the end of the war France sent an invoice to 
Congress for all of the military expenses that it had incurred between 1778 and 1782 which 
totaled approximately 18,000,000 pounds “with interest at five percent per annum…”  Although 
this one debt was  finally settled in 1795, it is said that the overall cost of the Revolutionary War 
was around 165,000, 000 pounds which  led to what Smith48 referred to as a  “downward dollar 
plunge and near bankruptcy” for the newly established American Republic. 49 
While there is no way of knowing how long the American colonies would have remained within 
the British fold if the Peace Commission’s offerings had not been rejected, given the 
seriousness of the issue at hand, It would  seem reasonable to ask why no attempt was made to 
delay the vote to provide more time for additional delegates to attend, or for those  already in 
attendance to consult with their colleagues at home before the final decision was rendered.  In 
1775-76, Congress delayed the vote on the Declaration itself for approximately three weeks 
(see page 3 above) to provide ample time for the delegates to decide how best to proceed.  We 
examined the minutes of all 46 sessions held by the Continental Congress between April 22 and 
June 17, 1778, and found no mention of any comparable motion before the final vote was 
rendered on June 17.   
Finally, and despite these considerations it must also be acknowledged that even if all of the 
elected delegates had been present in 1778 and a more balanced approach to the matter had 
been taken, it still might have been difficult for the United States to have negotiated a peaceful 
settlement with Great Britain.  The reason here being that on February 6, 1778, which was well 
before the Peace Commission arrived, the United States and France had already signed a 
military agreement known as the Treaty of Alliance.   Among the many items listed in the 
treaty, Article 8  contained the following provision: “Neither of the two parties shall conclude 
either a truce or peace with Great Britain, without the formal consent of the other first 
obtained…”50  Hence, for the United States to have accepted the Peace Commission’s offerings,  
it would have been necessary for France also to have agreed with their decision.  Because 
France was an avowed enemy of Great Britain such an agreement would have been extremely 
difficult to obtain and, without such an agreement, this potential treaty with Great Britain could 
not have been ratified.   Of equal importance, and as a further function of the Treaty of 
Alliance, a fleet of armed French ships had arrived off the coast of North America on July 8 and 




have taken place long before June 17, which by itself suggests that both France and the United 
States were already on their way to war with Britain long before the Peace Commission arrived.  
Thus, although we certainly agree with  the importance of Gregory’s concern over the 
meaningfulness of the term “unanimous,” it would appear from the above evidence coupled 
with this brief overview of the Treaty of Alliance, that beyond the motivational reasons given by 
Gregory for Congress’s dismissal of the Peace Commission’s offerings, a careful examination of 
the entire rationale behind the decision on June 17 could prove to be far more complex than 
previously  thought. 
 End Notes 
1Brodie, 1974. P. 120. 
2Armitage, 2007, p. 66. 
3Ferling, 2015, p. 160. 
4Maier, 1997, p. 152.  
5Fradin, 2002; Laird, 1987.  
6Anonymous, 1857, p. 12.  
7Hogeland, 2010, p. 151. 
8Laird, 1987, p. 338. 
9Goff, 1976. 
10Ritz, 1986, p. 194-195. 
11Maier, 1997, p. 156. 
12Black, 2008, p. 131. 
13Maier, 1997, p. 156-158. 
14Both the Sugar Act, passed by the British Parliament in 1764, and the Stamp Act, passed in 
1765, were repealed or revised largely as the result of protests that had taken place throughout 
the colonies.   The same was true  for three  of the four  grievances that stemmed from the 
Townshend Act, passed in 1767, and in reaction to the grievances associated with the 
Quartering Act of 1765, New York had refused to provide food and lodging to the British troops 




98).  As an aid to the reader, the following summaries contain the main provisions in these as 
well as in several other Acts that also gave rise to the grievances in the Declaration.  
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products imported into the colonies, it was particularly disruptive to the colonists’ trade with 
the West Indies because of the duty or tax  it enacted on sugar brought into the colonies from 
the French West Indies.   
Despite the harm that this tax produced on the colonies, its main purpose was to promote the 
business interests of the sugar colonies in the British West Indies.   To insure that all of the 
duties were collected and that purchases were confined to the British West Indies sugar 
colonies, “the act provided heavy penalties for all shippers, British and American alike, who 
tried to smuggle goods contrary to the terms of the law” (Beard, et. al., 1960, p. 101). 
The Stamp Act 
The terms of this act required the colonists to purchase and place stamps on all printed  matter 
such as  deeds, mortgages, colleges diplomas, and  licenses to practice law.   Stamps were also 
needed for playing cards, dice, almanacs, and calendars. The costs of the stamps, which ranged 
from a few pence to several pounds, affected not only the livelihood of merchants, lawyers, 
publishers and writers, but also the average consumer through the products they purchased.   
Although not a direct tax, as was the case with  the Sugar Act, “If the British Parliament had 
deliberately searched for taxes that would annoy as many Americans as possible, it could 
scarcely have improved upon the Stamp Act” (Beard, et. al., 1960, p. 102).  As an illustration of 
the level of this annoyance, in August 1765 crowds in Boston burned effigies  and destroyed the 
homes of the stamp distributor and the Massachusetts Lieutenant Governor (Wheeler and 
Becker, 2002, p. 77).   
The Townshend Act 
The Townshend Act also known as the Revenue Act imposed duties  on the import of glass, 
lead, paper, and painters’ colors.   To collect the duties, the Act  “gave  the higher courts in the 
colonies, made up of British judges, power to issue Writs of Assistance, authorizing customs 
officers to search  houses, warehouses, shops, cellars, and other places for smuggled goods and 
to seize them summarily if found” (Beard, et. al., 1960, p. 104).  
 In 1770, owing to  protests from the colonists, all of the components in this act  were repealed  
with one exception: tea.  That component  was then supplemented in 1773 by an additional act, 




pay duties on tea exported to the colonies.  Although at first glance this move by Parliament  
would appear to have been  favorable to the colonists, it is important to understand its history 
and its rationale, as interpreted by the colonists. 
The British East India Company held a monopoly on all trade between India and the rest 
of the empire.  This monopoly had yielded fabulous returns, but decades of corruption 
and inefficiency together with heavy military expenses in recent years had weakened 
the company until it was almost bankrupt.   
Among the assets of this venerable institution were some 17 million pounds of tea 
stored in English warehouses.  Normally, East India Company tea was sold to English 
wholesalers.  They in turn sold it to American wholesalers, who distributed it to local 
merchants for sale to the consumer.  A substantial British tax was levied on the tea as 
well as the three penny Townshend duty.  Now Lord North, the new prime minister, 
decided to remit the British tax and to allow the company to sell (the tea) directly in 
America through its own agents.  The savings would permit a sharp reduction of the 
retail price and at the same time yield a nice profit to the company (Garrraty & 
McCaughey, 1989, p. 65).  
Because of this move by Parliament the cost of East India tea would become lower than the 
cost of tea provided by many of the other companies that  also served the colonists.   The net 
effect of the move, however, was to force the closure of these other companies and thereby 
enable  the East India Company to achieve a monopoly in the sale of  its tea to the  colonists.  
This action was seen by the colonists  as “a step toward setting up British monopolies for the 
control of all American  foreign and domestic trade” (Beard, et. al., 1960, p. 105).  The public 
outrage was such that  
little groups of patriots that had had been formed in each town during the past three 
years to exchange revolutionary sentiments and unite colonial protests – swung into 
action, determined that the obnoxious beverage should never be landed.  When the 
ships arrived these groups were ready.  At New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston the 
captains were forced to turn back or store the cargo in warehouses (Billington, 
Loewenberg, and Brockunier, 1947, p. 53).  
The only exception was Boston where the tea ship Dartmouth arrived on November 17, 1773, 
and was allowed to unload by  order of the colony’s British appointed Governor.  Approximately 
one month later the tea chests on board were thrown into the harbour by a band of colonists 
which gave rise to what  has become known as the “Boston Tea Party.”  Arguably the most 
significant outcome of the Tea Party for the colonists was the passage in Parliament of The 




along with the custom house from Boston to Salem, it “closed the port of Boston to all 
commercial navigation until the tea, valued at around eighteen thousand pounds, should be 
paid for” (Faulkner, 1957, p. 110).  
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This act required the colonies to cover the cost of room and board for all the British soldiers 
sent to the colonies following the end of the seven year war between Britain and France.   
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that the war was over, the colonies saw no reason to cover the costs of housing a standing 
army during peacetime.  
Standing armies had been anathema to Englishmen since at least the early seventeenth 
century, and even in the mid-eighteenth century opposition to them remained an article 
of faith for many traditionally minded critics.  They regarded peacetime armies as 
expensive and unnecessary; more important, they considered them to be an 
indispensable support of arbitrary government.  Standing armies, they believed, 
threatened popular liberties wherever they appeared and were the tools of ambitious 
kings who sought to expand royal prerogatives at the expense of the people 
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